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Capital constraints and the performance
of entrepreneurial firms in Vietnam
Hien Thu Tran*,** and Enrico Santarelliy,z,§
Entrepreneurship has been among the key driving forces of the emergence of a
dynamic private sector during the recent decades in Vietnam. This article addresses
for Vietnam the questions “how capital constraints affect the performance of
family firms” and “how entrepreneurs’ human and social capital interact with
capital constraints to leverage entrepreneurial income.” A panel of 1721 firms in
4 years is used. Results are consistent with the resource dependency approach,
indicating an adverse effect of capital constraints on firm performance: firms
suffering capital constraints perform substantially better, suggesting that they
need more capital simply to finance newly recognized profit opportunities.
Human capital plays a vital role in relaxing capital constraints and improves the
entrepreneurial performance, whereas the effect of social capital stemming from
strong ties and weak ties is limited: strong ties bring emotional support and weak
ties give nonfinancial benefits from regular and useful business contacts.
Advanced econometric analysis tools to take into account the endogeneity of
capital constraints are used to establish relationships among relevant variables.
JEL classification: G24, L26, L25, L14.
1. Introduction
It is widely accepted that entrepreneurship is a crucial force of economic and social
development (Schumpeter, 1934; Audretsch, 1995; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000),
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which manifests itself through a process of discovery, evaluation, and exploitation of
opportunities for creating future goods and services (Venkataraman, 1997; Shane,
2000). The presence of constraints to the exploitation of such opportunities, which
might hinder the entrepreneurial ability to create value across time has created room
for a series of policy actions, ranging from those aimed at strengthening the training
capacity of business education in colleges and schools, to those aimed at promoting
the emergence of local clusters of the industrial district type, to those providing
business development services, to those promoting microfinance support programs
addressing financial constraints of start-up firms (loan schemes, tax incentives and
exemption, etc.). The emergence of these public programs has established a strong
assumption that scant availability of human capital, institutional constraints to
community building, and limited access to financial capital may significantly erode
entrepreneurial performance, which has been the dominant hypothesis in a number
of studies on start-up entrepreneurship (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Cooper et al.,
1994; Bosma et al., 2000; Parker and van Praag, 2006; Dilek et al., 2012).
Nevertheless, research seeking to single out the causes of observed performance dif-
ferentials across entrepreneurial firms has mostly focused on developed or advanced
countries, whereas there is little empirical evidence for transition countries.
To bridge this gap, in the present article we follow the approach residing at the
crossroad between economics and management sciences that has focused on the
factors that breed entrepreneurial success (see, among others, Schiller and
Crewson, 2007; Hitt et al., 2011; Lumpkin et al., 2011; Unger et al., 2011).Our
focus is on how entrepreneurial firms can achieve and maintain success by benefiting
from various sources of competitive advantage. In particular, we investigate the effect
of capital constraints on the subsequent performance of family businesses in
Vietnam, taking into account the possibility that human capital and social capital,
by boosting financial capital and easing access to credit, might also have indirect
effects on family firms’ ability to create and sustain a competitive advantage.
Consistent with the recent literature (La Porta et al., 1999; Astrachan and Shanker,
2003; Poza et al., 2004; Lumpkin et al., 2011), entrepreneurial firms in our sample are
typical family firms because they simultaneously display convergence of ownership
and control, family involvement in management, and realization of family
succession.
Whereas they have been widely studied in relation to developed countries,1 little
empirical research has been conducted to identify their importance, distinctiveness,
and challenges in post-socialist transition economies.2 Because Vietnam is character-
ized by a community culture favoring mutual trust and reciprocity among
1See, among others, Dyer and Handler, 1994; Perman, 2006; Shim and Okamuro, 2011.
2See, among others, Claessens et al. (2002); Luo et al. (2005); Yordanova (2011); Santarelli and Tran
(2012).
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family/network members, it is obvious that family firms among the population of
firms in the private sector take up a critical contribution to both their local and
national economy. Approximately, family firms in Vietnam take up around 90% of
all enterprise and around 80% of employment (GSO, 2007). They normally start at
microsize, adopt household ownership, stay in agricultural sector, and locate in rural
areas, which results insignificant challenges for their survival and growth that calls for
timely development policies and support from the government.
The contribution of this article is both empirical and methodological. First, we
study the interaction of human capital, social capital, and financial capital con-
straints and estimate their combined effects on the entrepreneurial performance of
family firms. Second, we assess the causal effects of entrepreneurs’ financial capital
constraints on their performance, by modeling these constraints as an endogenous
variable. For this purpose, we apply instrumental variable (IV) generalized method of
moments (GMM) technique to control for endogeneity after adopting Hausman’s
test confirming the endogeneity of financial capital constraints. This is a novelty with
respect to most of previous empirical studies, which have just treated financial capital
constraints as exogenous when exploring their impacts on entrepreneurial perform-
ance. With this approach we are instead able to give useful and consistent insights as
to whether endogeneity is a potential issue.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 surveys the literature on the issues
under investigation, Section 3 describes the data set, Section 4 sets up the empirical
strategy, Section 5 presents the empirical results, and the concluding section sum-
marizes the main findings and draws some policy suggestions.
2. Theoretical background
As research expands and matures, an increasing range of organizational theories is
being applied in the family firm context: agency theory (Faccio et al., 2001; Schulze
et al., 2001; Burkart et al., 2003; Chrisman et al., 2004; Dyer, 2006; Stewart and Hitt,
2012), stewardship theory (Miller et al., 2008; Zahra et al., 2008), resource-based view
(Chrisman et al., 2005; Dyer, 2006; Westhead and Howarth, 2006), and transaction
costs theory (for a review, see Verbeke and Kano, 2012). These theories are adopted to
explain unique features of “family effects,” i.e. family goals, family resources, and
owner-management relationships, and how they are different from those of nonfam-
ily firms in determining the organizational performance. Contradictory findings have
emerged from most of the empirical evidences presented to test these theories (Dyer,
2006). Besides, when coming to explore the “family effects” on the likelihood of a
family firm being capital constrained there is still a lack of influential theories.
Agency relationships arise when the entrepreneur calls for external investment
from venture capitalists, banks, or external investors for setting up his/her new
business. As a result of incongruent goals, self-utility maximization, and bounded
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rationality, information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and investors will allow
entrepreneurs to engage in opportunistic behaviors at the expense of outside
investors (Amit et al., 1990, 1998). Agency theory proposes that on one side,
owing to a substantial absence of conflicts of interest between owners and managers,
family firms may be characterized by a superior performance as compared with their
widely held counterparts (Fama and Jensen, 1983). But on the other side, it submits
that self-control problems and conflict of interests among family shareholders will
allow inside owners to use their power to extract private benefits for their personal
interests at the expense of outside owners/investors.
Traditionally, the logic of agency theory has been extended to explain the rela-
tionship between venture capitalist (external investor) and entrepreneur (Amit et al.,
1990; Sahlman, 1990; Sapienza and Gupta, 1994) as a source of capital constraints for
start-ups in general. To avoid and mitigate the consequences of agency problems as
well as safeguard their investment, investors use various monitoring mechanisms and
incentives. On one hand, they require business owners to invest a substantial portion
of their personal wealth in the new venture, acting as a reliable self-bonding such that
it cannot be retrieved and redeployed if the new business fails. On the other hand,
legally binding and comprehensive obligations are clearly specified in financing con-
tracts, and direct involvement of investors in monitoring the business will partly
reduce the likelihood of moral hazard on the part of the entrepreneur.
An important stream of literature has investigated the impact of financial
constraints on the initial performance of new firms, mostly bringing the tradition
initiated by Fazzari et al. (1988) in their seminal study on the effect of cash flow on
investment into the field of entrepreneurship and small business economics (for a
survey cf. Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). Inadequacy in financial resources is often a
primary reason for the failure of emerging businesses, given that firms with greater
financial resources can invest more in product/service development and have a larger
financial cushion to handle market downturns or managerial mistakes than firms
devoid of financial resources that are subject to credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981). However, the question here is the relationship between access to capital and
investment decisions of entrepreneurs. If capital markets are assumed to be perfect,
external funds provide a perfect substitute for internal capital, making the initial
financial conditions of the entrepreneur irrelevant to his/her investment and, there-
fore, his/her ability to create and sustain a competitive advantage. But, if capital
markets are assumed to be less perfect, say, owing to the existence of imperfect
and asymmetric information, then it may become costly and sometimes even
impossible for providers of external finance to evaluate the quality and feasibility
of an entrepreneur’s investment opportunities. As a consequence, internal and
external capital sources are not perfectly substitutable. Agency theory traces imper-
fect credit markets to asymmetric information. Lenders do not have sufficient
information about the creditworthiness of borrowers or risks of a project, which
they are financing. Good and creditworthy borrowers do not necessarily become
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selected as credit customers; and debt holders may allocate obtained loan to execute
more risky projects.
In contrast with agency theory’s assumption of managers’ self-serving goals, stew-
ardship theory suggests that organizational managers are motivated to serve as loyal
stewards of their firms and owners, acting in the organization’s best interest to
achieve its mission and vision. Stewardship theory has been applied to explore the
unique competitive advantage of family firms, stemming from the inherent tendency
toward stewardship behaviors of family leaders (see Miller et al., 2008; Zahra et al.,
2008). They “exhibit much care about business continuity, community, and connec-
tion: specially, about long-term preservation and nurturing of their business and its
markets, the fostering of talent and effective deployment of employees, and an em-
phasis on growing and sustaining relationships with clients” (Miller et al., 2008: 73).
The special attachment resulting from kinship relationship, a single family name, and
a common history develops and maintains “a shared identity in family firms and
contribute to building enduring social capital that can be relied upon through gen-
erations” (Verbeke and Kano, 2012: 1189).
Both the resource-based view of the firm and transaction costs theory focus on family
firms’ competitive advantage stemming from their unique human, financial, and
social resources and assets. “Valuable, rare, inimitable, and nonsubstitutable” re-
sources of family firms come from a common “family name” (Dyer, 2006: 262),
which inspires natural commitment and loyalty from family members (Ward, 1988)
and allows an early “socialization process” to capture hands-on experience from family
leaders (Dyer, 1992). The early involvement of family members in the business to
prepare themselves for future leadership roles without formal contracting becomes a
primary coordination mechanism in the family firm. Consistent with transaction costs
theory, this is associated to a type of “asset specificity” stemming from unique human
capital base available to family firms (Verbeke and Kano, 2012). On one hand, family-
based human asset specificity guarantees a stable and loyal human resource base with
limited danger of adverse selection for the firm; on the other hand, “bounded ration-
ality” of family members will place constraints on quality and quantity of financial
resources, which reduces the firm’s capacity in exploiting and adjusting optimally its
resource base swiftly as a function of economic change, and hence resulting in capital
constraints (Carney, 2005). Therefore, it is crucial to capture the established relation-
ships between these unique human and social resources of family firms and their
vulnerability to capital constraint as well as organizational performance.
Transition economies are characterized by high levels of resource constraints in
the form of shortage of managerial and technical skills and expertise, financial re-
sources, and technology. Astrachan (2010) observed that the business environment
in transition economies is volatile and fragile and therefore endangers the survival of
family firms because of unsophisticated regulatory systems providing financial and
other resource support. One way of acquiring resources and capabilities in transition
economies by family-owned firms is the utilization of unique human capital assets
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and networking relationships and ties (Miller et al., 2009). Due to the owner man-
agement nature of family businesses, they tend to be overly dependent on a single
decision maker (Feltham et al., 2005). Thus, it is crucial to investigate how the
characteristics of family firm entrepreneur (taking the role as the manager/owner)
as well as the overall family involvement in the business influence the entrepreneurial
behavior and subsequent organizational performance of new ventures.
Many researchers have attempted to measure the correlation between the entre-
preneur’s human/social capital and the subsequent entrepreneurial performance
(Pennings et al., 1998; Parker and van Praag, 2006; Santarelli and Tran, 2013).
However, the interaction among three key variables—entrepreneurs’ human/social
capital, entrepreneurial behavior with respect to accessing capital, and entrepreneur-
ial performance after start-up—is far beyond our knowledge. In this respect, the
resource-based view proves useful in positing that social capital is an important asset
for family firms because it allows them to gain access to other forms of capital, e.g.
financial capital, human or intellectual capital, that are essential for them to survive
and prosper. Families have some unique advantages in developing social capital
between the family and firm stakeholders through long-standing personal, rather
than impersonal, relationships across generations (Simon and Hitt, 2003). The
nature of enduring family connections and commitments brings certain social bene-
fits by reducing transaction costs, solving problems of coordination and easing the
access to resources that are not available to other nonfamily firms.
Empirically, while education level is conceived as an entrepreneur’s prior know-
ledge brought to the labor market and significantly determines his/her entrepreneur-
ial performance, another factor, social capital, could boost up his/her entrepreneurial
success through its complementary effect from its interaction with human capital
(Santarelli and Tran, 2013). The collective view of social capital considers it as social
networks provided by extended family- or community-based relationships (Putnam,
1993). The collective view argues that these social networks are likely to amplify the
effects of education, experience, and financial capital by facilitating resource transfer
and social support in the entrepreneurial process (Lin, 1990). Significant empirical
research shares the consensus that entrepreneurs’ social networks supplement the
effects of human and financial capital (Aldrich and Zimmer, 1986; Johannisson,
1988). Network members use their personal network of private and business contacts
to acquire resources and information that they would not (or not as cheaply) be able
to acquire on markets. Benefits from social networks can range from access to a
variety of scarce (Zimmer and Aldrich, 1987) and intangible resources (Bruderl and
Preisendorfer, 1998), to necessary information and advices on daily business deci-
sions (Smeltzer et al., 1991; Brown and Butler, 1995). By emphasizing prior inter-
action and cultural similarity among individuals, participation in networks that
enable an individual to overcome imperfect information problems and form con-
tracts with others (Glaeser et al., 2000) may well act as a factor of a financially
constrained individual being successfully involved in entrepreneurial activities. In
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the microfinance literature, it seems to be taken for granted that social capital, social
relations, networks, and so forth ease up credit constraints in the forms of joint
liability credit groups or as a screening device for rationing heterogeneous borrowers
(Dinh et al., 2012; Dufhues et al., 2012).
3. Overview of the Vietnamese case and data description
After Vietnam abandoned central planning in 1986, many private enterprises have
been established, with only a few of them set up through the transfer from state to
private ownership. Consequently, the 32-year-long experience of central planning in
Vietnam ended-up with the emergence of a young entrepreneurial class devoid of
business experience in either domestic or international markets (Abrami, 2003;
Tran-Nam and Pham, 2003; Hiemstra et al., 2006; Gutterman, 2011). Modern
Vietnam inherited from the communist one-party political system many institutional
constraints, with complex administrative regulation, excessive bureaucracy, and fre-
quent changes in requirements increasing the risk and cost of doing business for
private entrepreneurs. Besides, “red tape” requirements still permeate all levels of the
hierarchy, the system is dispersed and disorderly, corruption and bribery are
common, public servants are unskilled and under-qualified, economic growth is
accompanied by increased inequality (Glewwe and Dang, 2011; De Jong et al.
2012; Rand and Tarp, 2012). As a consequence, although the government has recog-
nized entrepreneurial activities as an essential driver of economic growth, entrepre-
neurship so far has not brought about the desired effects.
Along with a long-standing negative perception of doing business in Vietnamese
culture (Hoang and Dung, 2009), among the reasons of the slow development of a
strong entrepreneurial orientation in Vietnam there is the lack, common to most
post-socialist transitional economies of an established system of entrepreneurial fi-
nance. Since the early 1990s, shortage of capital was at the top of the list of con-
straints identified by Vietnamese entrepreneurs in almost every survey on private
small firms in the country. However, Rand (2007) in attempting to determine the
cost of capital in Vietnamese manufacturing indicates that the role of formal loans is
relatively unimportant for new business founders in comparison with that of infor-
mal loans as well as personal savings. Collateral requirements represented the largest
obstacle to access loans of significant size and maturity from the formal financial
system. Thus, entrepreneurs were used to rely on personal savings and informal
credit markets, even in the form of interest-free loans or gifts from family members
or friends,3 for start-up capital and to finance the first months of operations.
Nevertheless, the situation has improved recently with regard to access to formal
3Whereas interest-free loans from relatives and friends take the form of equity financing, and are
therefore a type of external financing, gifts from relatives and friends can be considered as de facto
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capital as a result of changes in credit regulations that eased the access to bank loans
for the private sector. In particular, when the new Law on State Bank and the Law on
Financial Institutions came into force, in 1998 the entire financial system was
strengthened and readdressed toward a more market-oriented approach. This
reform process led to a rapid increase of total credit granted by the largest state-
owned commercial banks to the domestic private sector in the following decades
(World Bank, 1999, 2005; Phuong, 2003). Nevertheless, until recently the state-
owned commercial banks’ reliance on political connections in determining loan
access has not served to direct credit to more profitable enterprises (Malesky and
Taussig, 2009).
In general, Vietnamese culture embeds strong family and community values in
every business activity and the whole macro business environment. Family firms play
a vital role in the economy of Vietnam, yet they are poorly understood and there is
little work on how family-owned firms use their human capital and social networks
to obtain resources and leverage them from initial capital constraints to create com-
petitive advantage. On one hand, it is likely that Vietnamese family firms get similar
impacts from external business environment and share some common features and
determinants for success with nonfamily peers. On the other hand, the nature of
family ownership will give them some unique characteristics both enhancing and
impeding their performance, such as family contractual relationships, the influence
of altruism on agency relationships, inheritance and continuity, avoidance or reduc-
tion of business risk, and so forth. Recent work argues that rural Vietnamese, taking
up 70% of the population, suffer significant credit constraints due to poorly func-
tioning credit markets (Barslund and Tarp, 2008).
The data set used in our empirical investigation is a 4-year panel of Vietnamese
private manufacturing enterprises from 2003 to 2006. The data set is extracted from
the two Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) surveys carried out in
2005 and 2007 covering rich information on various aspects of entrepreneurs and
their firms under the collaboration between Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social
Affairs in Vietnam, and the Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen,
Denmark. In which the 2005 survey has financial information of 2003 and 2004, and
the 2007 survey has financial information of 2005 and 2006.The surveys are broadly
representative of the Vietnamese population of entrepreneurs. The sample was drawn
randomly from a complete list of enterprises, where the stratified sampling procedure
was used to ensure the inclusion of an adequate number of enterprises in each
province with different ownership forms (for a comprehensive understanding of
the surveys, see Rand and Tarp, 2007). Entrepreneurs are considered as business
owners who started their own ventures or took over an existing business.
internal financing. Entrepreneurs with a preference for higher independence will be more reluc-
tant to accept any kind of equity financing.
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We identify family firms in the database as those (i) having “household” owner-
ship type, or (ii) having at least two family members working in the firm, one of
whom is the owner of the business if they are limited liability, joint stock, partner-
ship, or private firms. State-owned, state-invested, and foreign-invested firms are
excluded from the analysis. For the purpose of the estimation in which we want to
investigate the effect of initial capital constraints in the inception year as well as
during years in operation on the subsequent entrepreneurial performance of family
firms, we include in the sample only those firms having data at the inception year
and still surviving until 2006. In other words, failing firms before 2006 are removed
from the analysis. The final sample contains 1721 family firms in each year, which
forms a balanced panel of 1721 4 years¼ 6884 observations.
The data set contains a wide range of demographic, economic, financial, and
social variables, including ones relating to human capital, financial capital, social
capital of firms and their business performance. Firms are located in three large
metropolitan areas of Hanoi, Haiphong, and Hochiminh City and seven rural prov-
inces (Ha Tay, Phu Tho, Nghe An, Quang Nam, Khanh Hoa, Lam Dong and Long
An). Table 1 documents the number of family enterprises sampled in each ownership
form category in 2006.
Household business is the dominant ownership type among family firms, ac-
counting for more than 80% of the total. Of this fraction of family firms, 94% is
represented by microsized firms having fewer than nine employees. Microsized firms
occupy 75% of the sample size, which is somewhat under-representative compared
with the 99% of microsized firms in the whole population (Rand and Tarp, 2007).
Table 2 presents the sector-size tabulation (within manufacturing industry). Most
family firms reside in basic labor-intensive manufacturing sectors, food processing,
textile, footwear (40%), and wood/ metal products (44%), which are generally
technologically backward.
Table 1 Tabulation of legal ownership types and size of firms (2006)
Firm size Household
enterprises
Private Partnership/
cooperative
Limited
liability
Joint
stock
Total
Microsize 1232 (94.84) 33 (2.54) 9 (0.69) 23 (1.77) 2 (0.15) 1299 (100)
Small size 201 (54.91) 57 (15.57) 12 (3.28) 88 (24.04) 8 (2.18) 366 (100)
Medium size 5 (8.93) 7 (12.5) 2 (3.57) 38 (67.86) 4 (7.14) 56 (100)
Total 1438 (83.56) 97 (5.64) 23 (1.34) 149 (8.66) 14 (0.81) 1721 (100)
Group percentages in parentheses. Micro: 1–9 employees; Small: 10–49 employees; Medium:
50–299 employees (World Bank definition).
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Table 3 presents the gender-size tabulation. Male entrepreneurs account for three
quarters of the total sample. They also take somewhat similar share in the total in
each size category, a little bit higher for the category of small-sized firms with be-
tween 10 and 49 employees.
4. Econometric strategy
In this section, an empirical model that simultaneously estimates the effects of
financial, human, and social capital constraints on entrepreneurial performance is
developed.
Table 2 Number of enterprises by size and sector-2005 (1-digit ISIC code level—Only
manufacturing)
Industry Microsized Small
sized
Medium
sized
Total Percent
Food, textile, and footwear 549 (81.62) 109 (16) 23 (3.38) 681 (100) 39.57
Wood, chemicals, and metal products 526 (69.12) 209 (27.46) 26 (3.42) 761 (100) 44.22
Electricity, automobile vehicles,
construction
195 (69.89) 77 (27.6) 7 (2.51) 279 (100) 16.21
Total 1270 395 56 1721 100.00
Group percentages in parentheses. Micro: 1–9 employees; Small: 10–49 employees; Medium:
50–299 employees (World Bank definition).
Table 3 Number of enterprises by gender and size (2006)
Gender Microsized Small sized Medium sized Total
Male 905 (69.67) 260 (71.04) 37 (66.07) 1202 (100)
Female 394 (30.33) 106 (28.96) 19 (33.93) 519 (100)
Total 1299 (75.48) 366 (21.27) 56 (3.25) 1721 (100)
Percentages are in parentheses. Micro: 1–9 employees; Small: 10–49 employees; Medium:
50–299 employees (World Bank definition).
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4.1 Definition of variables
Entrepreneurial performance is measured by the success of family firms. Because the
most widely used measures for entrepreneurial performance are accounting and
growth measures (Timmons, 1994),4 in this article we use total gross annual business
income. Business income is defined as total gross profit from the business before
deducting tax and interests but after subtracting business-related costs. We take the
logarithm of profit to obtain a reliable measure of the elasticity between firm per-
formance and independent variables. The measure of gross business income could
make the estimation biased and meaningless without scaling to size. Thus, we control
for the size of family firms with respect to both labor size (number of employees) and
economic size (log of total assets). On the other hand, Schulze et al. (2001) propose
that growth rate is a more reliable measure of family-firm performance than income-
based measures because privately held firms have incentive to minimize reported
taxable income and no incentive to minimize reported sales. Thus, growth of sales is
also adopted as another dependent variable. Because taking logarithm of profit will
filter out bad performers (making a loss), growth of sales does take into account
negative growth in the estimation, and hence helps us understand the overall effect of
interested factors on family firms’ business performance. Nevertheless, only 18 firms
in the sample record their business income as “loss” in a particular year. We separate
out the impact of inflation on the real financial performance (sales and profit) of
firms in a particular year by deflating current/nominal financial data using the na-
tional gross domestic per capita (GDP) deflator for private sector (Table 4).
Human capital enters our model in its three components: (i) education, proxied
with entrepreneurs’ prior knowledge, enters the analysis as a dummy variable, differ-
entiating the high-educated business founders (university/college and technical high
school) from the less-educated ones (vocational training or no education); (ii) in-
dustry experience; and (iii) self-employment experience, which are also measured as
dummies attaining value one if the entrepreneur possesses that experience, and zero
otherwise.
There are as many ways to measure social capital as there are definitions. In
contrast to human capital, which is based in individuals, social capital resides in
relationships (Coleman, 1988). Social capital is conceived as benefits obtained from
entrepreneurs’ personal and formal business networks/associations. We adopt the
Granovetter’s (1973) model, in which network partners are classified in terms of
“strong ties” and “weak ties”. Strong/weak social ties are relations with high/low
levels of emotional attachment, including the entrepreneur’s family, relatives, and
friends. Bruderl and Preisendorfer (1998), Davidsson and Honig (2003), Greve and
Salaff (2003) claim that support from strong ties is more important than support
4For a review on the classification of performance measures of entrepreneurial ventures, see Deeds
et al. (1998).
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from weak ties in all phases of establishing a firm. The presence of an entrepreneur in
the family can compensate for financial and managerial restrictions. Further, emo-
tional support received from a family member who is an entrepreneur might be
helpful to sustain emotional stability. We include two variables to get an impression
about the role of family members, relatives, and friends in both the start-up and
growth period of family businesses: (i) financial support, captured by the percentage
of initial investment capital as loans from strong ties; (ii) emotional support, as a
dummy to indicate the likelihood of receiving emotional support and encourage-
ment from other family entrepreneurs. Weak ties are based on relations devoid of
any emotional attachment, such as those with acquaintances, business partners, and
colleagues. Granovetter (1973), Putnam (1993), Davidsson and Honig (2003)
emphasize the “strength of weak ties” and argue that weak ties are less reliable but
provide access to a variety of new information and knowledge during the recognition
and exploitation period of entrepreneurial opportunities. We will examine the “net-
work success hypothesis” to understand the effect of entrepreneurs’ formal business
network participation on subsequent business performance. Three variables will be
constructed: (i) formal business network participation, which is a dummy attaining
value one if the entrepreneur joins one or more than one network,5 and zero
Table 4 GDP Deflator (2000–2008)
Categories Unit: %
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.5 3.0
By type of ownership
State 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.7
Nonstate 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.9
Collective 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.9
Private 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.8
Household 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.4 3.0
Foreign investment sector 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.3 4.2
By kind of economic activity
Agriculture, forestry, and fishery 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.8 3.8
Industry and construction 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.9
Service 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.8
Source: GSO, 2010.
5The dummy combines the answers to two questions: “Do you participate in one business net-
work?” and “Do you participate in more than one network?”.
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otherwise; (ii) network size,6 which is the sum of regular contacts (at least once every
3 months) that entrepreneurs find useful for their business operations in four
categories (business people in the same line of business and in different lines of
business, bank officials, and mass organizations); and (iii) network intensity, i.e.
frequency of network assistance in a year.7
Capital constraints (often referred as credit constraints) have been generally
measured in two ways. The indirect method indicates the presence of credit
constrains from violation of the assumptions of the permanent income hypothesis.
The common proposition is that “without the presence of credit constraints, tran-
sitory income shocks should not affect consumption.” Prominent literature applying
this method includes Deaton (1990), Browning and Lusardi (1996). However, evi-
dences from this permanent income approach are inconclusive because a number of
other intrinsic and extrinsic factors influencing human consumption level under
conditions of uncertainty, such as precautionary behaviors and initial asset position
of firms violate the implication of the permanent income model. The second method
of detecting the presence of capital constraints uses direct answers from firms to
several qualitative questions on whether they perceive themselves as credit
constrained from their participation and experience in the credit market. Typical
questions are normally concerned with entrepreneurs’ lack of capital, application for
loans, experience of rejections from credit holders, or failure to receive sufficient
loans. Owing to its straightforward nature, this method has been widely used by
various researchers exploiting contextualized surveys in different countries (Feder
et al., 1990; Jappelli, 1990; Bosma et al., 2004). Rand (2007) applies this method with
direct information from the same survey that this article uses to show that borrowing
constraints restrict firm access to credit, and credit-constrained firms would increase
their debt by 34% if borrowing constraints were relaxed. This article will also adopt
this method to detect the presence of capital constrains of family firms. Similar to
Rand (2007), we categorize firms as being credit constrained based on direct replies
to whether the firm applied for credit and if they were denied access in case they
applied. However, we also take into account the fact that firms are in need for loans
but are not eligible for loans or firms cannot obtain sufficient loans as they desire.
Specially, the variable is an interaction dummy formed by responses to the five
questions in the DANIDA survey: (i) which difficulties were encountered when the
enterprise was established?, and the respondent chose “lack of capital” as the diffi-
culty; (ii) did you apply for loans given the difficulty of lack of capital?; (iii) why you
did not apply for loans?; (iv) Did you experience any problems getting the loan?, i.e.
being rejected; and (v) Do you still think that you are in need of a loan?. The firm is
6We define network size as the number of people that the business owners know and interact with
personally (Greve and Salaff, 2003).
7The variable is operationalized by the answer of the question “how many times a year the entre-
preneur receives the assistance in issues directly related to the operation of his firm?”.
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capital constrained if the interaction dummy attains value 1 in the following three
cases, and 0 otherwise:
Yes, I encountered lack of capital, applied for loan but faced difficulty in obtaining loan
(being rejected)
5.4%
Yes, I encountered lack of capital, applied for loan, but still in need for further loans
(could not obtain sufficient loan)
14.3%
Yes, I encountered lack of capital, but did not apply for loan due to
— No collateral mortgage 3.9%
— Already heavily indebted 0.17%
— Interest rates too high or the procedure too complicated 2.24%
Total 26.01%
We consider the 26.01% of entrepreneurs who resided in these three cases as being
capital constrained. The other 74% who did not report “lack of capital” as the
difficulty in setting up the business are characterized as facing no capital constraints.
Our variable takes into account the possibility of obtaining external capital and the
fact that entrepreneurs use their own personal equity to fund their start-ups, either in
part of whole. In fact, personal capital is widespread in the DANIDA sample: 60% of
respondents reported that 100% of investment capital comes from their personal
savings; 20% injected at least 70% of the total investment as their own savings. It also
considers the fact that the entrepreneurs do not apply for loans does not mean that
they are not capital constrained. They have low credit scoring (unable to meet criteria
for credit granting), lack relevant mortgage, or the apply-for-loan procedure is too
complex and time-consuming.
However, several reasons may lead to biased measurement of capital constraints.
First, self-reported subjective answers to this question from respondents could result
in misleading estimation due to over- or under-reporting. The more, the better:
entrepreneurs normally are never satisfied with their available investment budget,
and they tend to report capital constraint (or lack of capital) to bargain for other
business support (tax exemption). Second, this direct approach is still incapable of
providing a satisfactory quantification of the extent to which firms are capital con-
strained and how capital constraints impact on the subsequent entrepreneurial per-
formance. In other words, as a dummy attaining value one if the entrepreneur
reports a constraint and zero otherwise, the variable only accounts for the actual
presence and absence of constraints, but fails to indicate different degrees or intensity
of capital constraints that a continuous variable can do. The next issue is the pos-
sibility that capital constraint is endogenous. It is expected that unobserved individ-
ual characteristics, such as ability and motivation, that affect banks’ loan scoring and
screening procedures may result in different levels of capital constraints and subse-
quent performance.
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Why some firms are more capital constrained than others? Is it partially due to
different levels of entrepreneurial performance pursued by different firms, which are
inherently and profoundly influenced by personal characteristics of the firm leader
(Kellermans et al., 2008)? Thus, the leader’s personal and household characteristics
that are likely to affect the extent of capital constraints and entrepreneurial behaviors
of family firms such as age, tenure, gender are included as control variables. The
entrepreneur’s age and tenure may be particularly significant influences on entre-
preneurial performance because he/she tends to remain in managerial power much
longer than his/her peers in nonfamily firms (Gersick et al., 1997), and thus has an
enduring impact on the firm’s organizational culture and orientation. The involve-
ment of other family members in managerial positions, especially a trusted successor
willing to take over the leadership of the firm, is crucial to guarantee a smooth
succession process (Sharma et al., 2003). Hence, number of household members
currently working in the enterprise will be controlled in the analysis.
Income and capital constraints might also be affected by entrepreneurs’ initial
financial circumstances. For example, an entrepreneur who continues to receive
some incomes from other income-generating jobs, or who has rich personal savings
and support from other family entrepreneurs sufficiently covering total investment
required can be expected to relax his/her capital constraint. However, their effects on
performance may go either way. The extent of capital constraints might be negatively
related to personal equity, but positively related to total capital required. These
factors also influence how banks screen various projects: for example, they frequently
value strong commitment from those entrepreneurs who inject their own personal
equity into the venture. We also control for the likelihood that firms officially register
their establishment under the Enterprise Law to obtain the “business registration
license.” We assume that the formality, under bank screening system, will pave the
way to various credit sources. Finally, the size of capital required is contingent on the
capital-intensive nature of products and services produced by firms. Thus, we also
control for the capital intensity of the industry in which the entrepreneur starts
his/her venture, with the expectation that start-ups in capital intensive industries
have a greater likelihood of being capital constrained.8 Other control variables that
potentially affect entrepreneurial performance are current age and size of the firm.
Size of the firm is measured in both employment size (logarithm of total number of
employees) and economic size (logarithm of total assets of the firm). We control for
the survey to take into account any divergence or mismatch arising from conducting
two surveys at different time, rather than on yearly basis. Table 5 presents the
descriptive statistics of all adopted variables.
8According to the trade-off theory, because the asset type and risk vary by industries, the average
capital structure should also vary by industries (Myers, 1984); thus, firms within the same industries
are more alike with respect to their capital structure determinants than firms in other industries
(Hall et al., 2000).
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Table 5 Summary statistics of financial capital independent variables
Variable Observations Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Dependent variable
Annual log income (y) 6866 10.495 1.292 3.707 16.005
Growth of sales 5158 0.329 1.506 0.949 24.567
Endogenous variable
Capital constraint 6884 0.258 0.437 0 1
Exogenous variables
Number of household members
working in the enterprise
6884 2.208 1.143 0 14
Current age 6884 46.2 9.962 20 91
Female 6884 0.301 0.459 0 1
Tenure 6884 12.227 7.037 0 58
Initial human capital
Professional education 6884 0.232 0.422 0 1
Industry experience 6884 0.526 0.499 0 1
Self-employment experience 6884 0.272 0.445 0 1
Initial financial capital
Number of other income generating
jobs
6884 1.314 0.541 0 7
The firm is the main income source 6884 0.903 0.295 0 1
Initial capital investment 6884 10.878 1.939 4.605 17.239
Personal equity 6884 83.276 26.245 0 100
Debt ratio (total debt/total asset) 6884 0.0888 0.3555 0 13.261
Initial social capital
Business network participation 6884 0.0674 0.251 0 1
Network size 6884 27.686 30.309 1 506
Network intensity 6884 6.854 12.741 0 70
Emotional support from self-employed
household members
6884 0.151 0.358 0 1
Loans from family/relatives/friends
(strong ties)
6884 9.531 19.863 0 100
Additional control variables
Capital intensity 6884 0.911 1.405 0.0053 35.92
Registered under enterprise law 6884 0.211 0.408 0 1
Firm labor size 6884 1.701 0.995 0 6.109
Firm economic size (log of total asset) 6884 12.888 1.718 6.907 18.967
Firm age 6884 13.494 8.909 2 78
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4.2 Estimation methodology
Before figuring out an appropriate estimation model, it is important to be aware of
data limitations of the data set. On one hand, many of our independent variables
rarely change or do not change at all overtime, such as entrepreneurs’ character-
istics like age, gender, education, prior experience. Even our key financial explana-
tory variables, such as capital constraint dummy, initial capital investment, and
personal equity, by construction are already determined from the establishment
year. On the other hand, due to the surveys’ implementation procedure, some
nonfinancial variables used are only available/observable for 2004 and 2006, such
as social capital variables. Although it is plausible to assume that social factors of
firms do not vary much on a yearly basis, our interest is in the initial financial
investment/constraint, initial human capital and social capital (that are clearly
predetermined and exogenous) on subsequent entrepreneurial performance, not
in the variations in firms regarding these variables from year-to-year. Therefore,
these time-invariant and rarely changing variables having little explanatory power
will result in imprecise coefficient estimates that have large standard errors, and
should call for our caution in applying an estimation model for our panel data
analysis.
In the context of data sets, the use of fixed effects does more harm than good
because it removes all time-invariant effects from the analysis. Plumper and
Troeger (2007) propose the fixed-effects vector decomposition estimation
(xtfevd procedure), an emerging and popular technique for estimating time-in-
variant variables in panel data models with group effects. However, critics have
been raised against this technique. The decomposition estimator will have higher
risk than existing random effect approach, especially if the endogeneity problem
of any time-invariant variables is detected (which is the case here, tested below)
(Breusch et al., 2011). Therefore, one of the estimation models we apply is
random effects.
The existing empirical evidences on capital constraints of firms commonly use the
direct method in a straightforward way, in which capital constraint is treated as
exogenous, i.e. systematically unaffected by changes in other variables of the
model. This assumption is easily violated because it is possible that factors determin-
ing the likelihood that a firm is capital constrained (such as income sources, initial
investment size, household characteristics of the entrepreneur, or capital-intensity of
the industry/sector that the firm operates in) also have influence on its business
performance. Thus, in this article, capital constraint is tested and controlled for its
endogeneity.
In the following section, we demonstrate the importance of treating capital con-
straints as endogenous. Under the presence of endogeneity, we apply the IV GMM
method, which has been proved to be superior to the conventional two-stage least
square if heteroskedasticity is detected (Baum and Schaffer, 2003).The parameters of
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the performance equation accounting for the potentially endogenous capital con-
straint are estimated by the following two steps:
First step: Random probit estimation. The capital-output ratio (the ratio of total
assets to total revenue) is a widely used measure of capital intensiveness among
industries (Acs and Audretsch, 1987). For the case of Vietnam, we subtract the
value of land from total assets, as land takes the majority part in the total assets of
some traditional industries but land evaluation is somewhat biased and problematic
in Vietnam.9 We use this ratio as an identifying instrument z (from the above esti-
mation model) for capital constraint. Predicted fitted values will be obtained from
this random probit regression.
Second step: robust GMMs estimator (Baum and Schaffer, 2003). The predicted
fitted values from the first step will be used as the instrument for the endogenous
capital constraint in this regression. Ordinary least squares (OLS) is actually a special
case of GMM when heteroskedasticity is not present. However, if heteroskedasticity
is present, as it is the case here,10 the GMM estimator is more efficient than the OLS
estimator (Baum and Schaffer, 2003).
5. Estimation results
5.1 Importance of endogeneity issues
Capital constraints are likely to be an endogenous variable in the entrepreneurial
performance equation (Santarelli and Piergiovanni, 1995). We can test directly the
relevance of correcting for endogeneity by applying Hausman’s test for endogeneity
(1978). The validity of Hausman’s test depends on the underlying choice of iden-
tifying instruments satisfying quality and validity criteria. The test begins with the
reduced form regression and then residuals predicted from this regression are added
into the structural form regression. The endogeneity problem is determined based on
the significance of the residual coefficient. However, it is impossible to predict
residuals as usual with random probit estimation used in the reduced form regres-
sion. For binary outcomes, “deviance residual” is in common use. We acquire
“probit deviance residuals” through the generalized linear model transformation.11
9Land evaluation system is complex and problematic in Vietnam. Because the people own, and the
state manages land, in legal theory it has not market value. Instead, the state has enacted statutory
pricing formula for calculating land values. Households have low incentives to claim for land use
right to avoid tax. Untitled land transactions incur no transfer tax (while titled land transfers are
taxed at 4 percent of the sale price). (AusAid working paper 4, 2000).
10The Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity produces the chi2 statistic of 152.3 with P-value of
0.00, which does not support the hypothesis of constant variance.
11McCullagh and Nelder (1989) claim that generalized linear models provide a unified framework,
which can be applied to various ‘linear’ models. Such transformations are referred to as link
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Relevance (Hausman’s test) 2 (1)¼ 40.65
P¼ 0.000
Quality test (correlated with regressors) 2 (1)¼ 9.45
P¼ 0.0021
Validity test (exogeneity condition) – Hansen J test 2 (1)¼ 2.087
P¼ 0.148
The significance of the statistics given by the relevance test suggests that capital
constraints are indeed endogenous in the entrepreneurial performance equation. IV
is known to be an appropriate estimator in the presence of endogeneity (Wooldridge,
2000). Following Parker and van Praag (2006), we propose to use industry capital
intensity ratio as the IV for capital constraint. We argue that the feature of capital
intensity in an industry is related to the likelihood of capital constraints of a firm in
that industry, but less likely to determine its performance. Indeed, the IV also passes
the quality test and the validity test. The Sargan validity test can be used in over-
identifying cases, i.e. when there are more IVs than endogenous ones. Thus, the test
is not valid in this case: the model is just identified.
5.2 First step: Determinants of entrepreneurs’ capital constraints
Table 6 presents estimates of the capital constraint equation by random probit
regression.
The key result is that entrepreneurs who have other income-generating sources are
significantly more capital constrained. Capital constrained entrepreneurs facing dif-
ficulties in obtaining external capital are more motivated to search for other jobs to
leverage their income or partly relax capital shortage of their venture. As expected,
entrepreneurs located in capital intensive industries are significantly more likely to
face capital constraints than those located in industries in which less capital is
needed. This effect is complementary to the scale effect from capital required,
which is consistent with the perception that banks’ screening systems place more
reluctance to capital intensive industries with high sunk costs and complicated pro-
duction techniques. Furthermore, the amount of personal equity injected at the start
has a strongly negative effect on the extent of capital constraints. The probability of
this effect decreases as the amount of personal business capital increases.
functions. Different types of response variables use different link functions: both the logit and
probit link functions work with binomial response variables. The generalized linear models take
the form:
g E y
   ¼ x, y ! Ff g
where F is the distribution family and g() is the link function.
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Entrepreneurs having professional education are less likely to encounter capital
constraints. Prior knowledge will help them actively to acquire financial resources
from other income or loan sources. This is consistent with other comparable studies
by Bosma et al. (2004) and Parker and van Praag (2006). However, the estimated
Table 6 Estimates of the capital constraint equation
Variable Coefficient Standard error z-ratio
Initial human capital
Professional education 0.246a 0.122 2.02
Industry experience 0.614b 0.161 3.82
Self-employment experience 0.319b 0.099 3.23
Initial financial capital
Number of other income generating jobs 0.129a 0.082 1.8
The firm is the main income source 0.392b 0.149 2.63
Initial capital investment 0.102a 0.0478 2.14
Personal equity 0.039b 0.0053 7.38
Initial social capital
Business network participation 0.728b 0.191 3.8
Network size 0.005b 0.0012 3.97
Network intensity 0.0164b 0.0035 4.71
Emotional support from self-employed
household members
0.118 0.117 1.01
Loans from strong ties 0.015a 0.0068 2.2
Additional control variables
Number of household members
working in the enterprise
0.0021 0.0439 0.05
Current age 0.0162a 0.0086 1.87
Female 0.534b 0.173 3.09
Tenure 0.034a 0.18 1.82
Firm labor size 0.239b 0.079 3.01
Firm economic size 0.0072 0.045 0.016
Firm age 0.007 0.014 0.5
Capital intensive industry 0.0574a 0.0264 2.17
Registered under Enterprise Law 0.472a 0.219 2.15
Intercept 0.071 0.908 0.08
Wald 2 (16) 260.45b
Log likelihood 2468.8239
Number of observations 6884 (1721 groups)
aSignificant at 5% level.
bSignificant at 1% level.
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coefficient is relatively much smaller in absolute terms even though it is statistically
significant with a P-value of 4.4%. Others kept constant, professional education from
university, college, and technical high school relaxes the capital constraint by 0.24
percentage points.
Education level is one important indicator for borrowers’ liquidity level, based on
which lenders determine their loan grants. However, the economic effect of
education is much lower than that found in other studies, which stems from the
unique characteristics of the credit market in Vietnam, where the informal credit
market (black market) is developed (Rand, 2007) and the formal credit market
(social policy and commercial banks) mainly prioritizes disadvantaged entrepreneurs
or entrepreneurs with political connections for loans. The banking sector in Vietnam
is government controlled; thus, credit policies are mainly politics based and only
market based in those credit-prioritized sectors. On the other hand, to obtain formal
loans, entrepreneurs need to have adequate collateral (such as certificate of land
ownership). Rand and Tarp (2007) claim that 30% of entrepreneurs who do not
apply for loan should be considered as credit constrained, as they do not have
adequate collateral. Other human capital variables (industry and self-employment
experience) are also statistically significant in explaining the likelihood of entrepre-
neurs’ capital constraints. While self-employment experience helps entrepreneurs to
relax their capital constraints, industry experience worsens the potential constraint.
The results are consistent with Parker and van Praag (2006) although their results are
not statistically significant. It is our conjecture that experience from previous busi-
ness start-up equips entrepreneurs with the ability to overcome initial financial
challenges, either being able to call for loans from both formal and informal sources
or gaining financial support and investments from participating social business
network. However, experience from working in the same industry will enable entre-
preneurs to discover and recognize more entrepreneurial opportunities, which are
available for profitable exploitation, and thus expose themselves to higher demands
for investment capital.
Regarding the impact of social capital on entrepreneurs’ financial capital con-
straint, network participation turns out to be positively related to capital constraint
of the entrepreneur. Network members are significantly more capital constrained
than nonmembers. It could be either that more constrained entrepreneurs join net-
works to seek for financial support (self-selection) or the causal effect could be the
other way around: network members discover more business opportunities from
joining the network, which requires them to call for more investment capital, and
thus become capital constrained. It could also be the case that formal networks in
Vietnam do not bring expected financial benefits to members, such as sharing re-
sources and capital. In other words, we need to control for the endogeneity of capital
constraint to investigate the real effects of formal networks in Vietnam. When we
look at the effect of personal network structure (network size and network intensity)
on the likelihood of capital constraints, it seems that the latter assumption may be
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more appropriate. Personal network membership does not help the entrepreneur to
reduce his/her capital constraint from the size of the network, i.e. number of mem-
bers within the network, but rather from the frequency of assistance from these
contacts. In this respect, we have to recall that in Vietnam entrepreneurs might be
involved in formal network activities for political reasons rather than business-
related ones. This in turn may imply that network activities are limited to the
facilitation of the policy-making process of the government. But before drawing
any straightforward conclusion, it is worth looking at the results accruing from
analysis of the effect of network participation on the performance of firms in our
sample (see Section 5.2 below).
Other findings from control variables show that older and female entrepreneurs
face less capital constraints than their younger and male counterparts. This suggests
that older entrepreneurs might get more experience of how to obtain external capital
from the credit market and that women are more able to obtain resources from their
partners. As expected, leader’s tenure has negative effect on his/her capital constraint.
Longer tenure goes together with richer experience in overcoming any business
operational challenges and stronger commitment to a smooth succession process
by not engaging in risky and capital-intensive business adventures. We also find
statistical support for our assumption that firms formally registered under the
Enterprise Law are less capital constrained. Their formality enables them to have
easier access to external capital sources under banks’ screening system. Finally, larger
firms, in terms of labor size, have more constraints for investment capital than
smaller ones do.
5.3 Second step: The effect of capital constraints on entrepreneurial performance
We now present results from estimation of the structural equation, the second stage
of the two-stage IV regression. The results, summarized in Table 7, are based on both
panel random effect and IV estimators. In general, estimated coefficients from IV
regression with business operating profit as the dependent variable are more signifi-
cant (even reported with robust standard errors) and reasonable than those from the
random regression and IV regression with growth of sales as the dependent. The
Hausman specification test indicates that IV regression with profit as the dependent
variable is preferable at 1% significance level compared with the IV regression with
growth of sales as the dependent.12
In terms of the effect of capital constraints on entrepreneurs’ business incomes,
the interesting finding here is the positive coefficient of capital constraints
(CAPCON) that shows a positive influence of capital constraints on entrepreneurial
performance. In fact, it implies that other things constant, being capital constrained
12H0: difference in coefficients not systematic
2 (23)¼ 7737.3; P¼ 0.0000
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(as compared with not being) increases entrepreneurs’ average business incomes by
6.3% and growth of sales by about 9%. The size of this effect appears substantial,
although it should be borne in mind that the average extent of capital constraints
faced by entrepreneurs in our sample is 26% (450 entrepreneurs out of 1721). This
result is consistent with those by Malesky and Taussig (2009), who found that pol-
itical connections are an ineffective tool for channeling bank credit to the most
profitable investors. In fact, these authors provide evidence that Vietnamese com-
mercial banks place greater value on connections than performance, with the con-
sequence that a large share of credit is allocated to enterprises in less competitive
industries and regions. This leads to the fact that, paradoxically, firms with greater
access to bank loans are no more profitable and sometimes even less profitable than
firms without connections.
To explain the above finding, we propose three additional reasons.
First, the informal credit market in Vietnam is developed sufficiently to mitigate
pressure from capital constraints. Capital-constrained firms can easily obtain infor-
mal loans from friends, relatives, or even black market. One possibility for those
entrepreneurs who obtain loans from informal sources (mostly from friends and
relatives) is that they can even perform better due to the absence of monthly interest
pressure.
Second, when we compare the mean profit between the capital-constrained group
and the nonconstrained group, it turns out that the constrained firms have much
higher profit than the others. A t-test on an equal-variances assumption of profit
means for the two groups is also included. Based on the evidences in Tables 8 and 9,
we can reject the equal-variances assumption to support the one-tailed test that the
profit mean of the nonconstrained group is smaller than that of the constrained
group at 5% significance level. Thus, capital-constrained firms in Vietnam (mostly
young and new start-ups) are those firms in the “full bloom” of development. They
are constrained because they need capital for newly recognized entrepreneurial
opportunities. The credit obtained is used for new profitable investments, not for
daily business operations. Nonconstrained firms do not apply for loans simply be-
cause they do not have any new investments that are in need of capital.
Third, the debt share of enterprises in our sample is low (around 10% of total
assets) confirming the results in Rand (2007) showing that external debt is not
among the preferred financing strategies by Vietnamese (small) firms. It is also
worth noting that even when enterprises obtain some credit, 60% of the “noncon-
strained” group still has a need for loans.
The effect of education proxied by the likelihood of obtaining professional edu-
cation is statistically greater than zero, which means that it plays an essential role in
differentiating the performance of entrepreneurs. The magnitude of education coef-
ficient reflects the significant economic importance of educational level, obtaining
professional education from university, college, and technical high school is likely to
bring approximately 7.5% more profits and higher growth of sales by 12%. The
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indirect effect of education through the capital constraint can be calculated by multi-
plying the estimated parameter of professional education in the reduced form with
the estimated parameter of CAPCON in the structural equation,
CE¼0.246 0.063¼0.015. This suggests a total rate of return from education
for entrepreneurs of 6% (CEþ E¼ 0.075–0.015). One of the reasons why educa-
tion significantly reduces the likelihood of capital constraints of entrepreneurs is
related to its role of key screening criteria for offering credits, even if this explanation
may be more appropriate for the screening process of commercial banks where they
aim to maximize profits from their investment decisions. Loans from social policy
Table 8 Gross profit comparison between capital-constrained and nonconstrained firms (in
1000VND)
Groups Observation Mean SE SD 95% Confidence interval
Non capital-constrained
firms
5108 109,342.8 5924.668 423,437.6 97,727.87 120,957.6
Capital-constrained
firms
1776 123,950 7155.011 301,530.9 109,916.8 137,983.1
Analysis of variance:
Ho: mean(nonconstrained)mean(constrained)¼diff¼ 0
Ha: diff50 Ha: diff!¼0 Ha: diff40
t¼1.3404 t¼1.3404 t¼1.3404
P5t¼0.0901 P4jtj ¼0.1802 P4t¼0.9099
Note: diff!¼ 0: difference is not equal to zero, i.e. gross profit of capital-constrained firms is
not statistically equal to gross profit of non capital-constrained ones.
Table 9 Growth of sales comparison between capital-constrained and nonconstrained firms
Groups Observation Mean SE SD 95% Confidence interval
Non capital-constrained firms 3862 0.31022 0.025 1.5537 0.2612 0.3592
Capital-constrained firms 1296 0.3879 0.0376 1.3557 0.3141 0.4618
Analysis of variance:
Ho: mean(nonconstrained)mean(constrained)¼ diff¼0
Ha: diff50 Ha: diff!¼ 0 Ha: diff40
t¼1.6082 t¼1.6082 t¼1.6082
P5t¼0.0539 P4jtj ¼ 0.1079 P4t¼ 0.9461
Note: diff!¼ 0: difference is not equal to zero, i.e. gross profit of capital-constrained firms is
not statistically equal to gross profit of non capital-constrained ones.
26 of 38 H. T. Tran and E. Santarelli
 at R
M
IT U
niversity Library on M
arch 10, 2016
http://icc.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
banks are often granted to disadvantaged entrepreneurs or those under preferential-
supported policies.
However, given the fact that attaining professional education level from low or no
education level requires at least 3 years (for instance, the shortest path is from
secondary school to technical high school), i.e. approximately an average rate of
return of maximum 2% per year, a comparison with other OLS estimates of
return to education in entrepreneurship reveals that this estimate is somewhat
lower than previous findings. For example, in a survey of 21 previous studies dealing
with the relationship between education and entrepreneurial earnings, Van der Sluis
et al. (2003) report an average rate of return of 6.1% for studies based on US data,
with a somewhat lower average rate of return for European studies. Parker and van
Praag (2006) find the rate of return to schooling of Dutch entrepreneurs to be 7.2%.
Trostel et al. (2002) pooling microsamples across 28 countries suggest a worldwide
OLS estimate of the rate of return to schooling of 4.8% for men and 5.7% for
women.
For a dynamic and transition economy as Vietnam’s, market experience from
operating the business in practice is more important in boosting entrepreneurial
performance than the formal education achieved at schools, which is always under
the controversial complaints that education does not meet labor market’s demands.
However, similar to capital constraint equation, we could only find the statistically
significant positive effects of prior entrepreneurial experience (self-employment ex-
perience) on entrepreneurial gross income. Other things held constant, entrepre-
neurs having self-employment experience are likely to generate 5.6% profit more
than inexperienced peers. While some of the information and skills necessary to
exploit an opportunity can be learned through education or through managerial
and industry experience, much of important information and knowledge about
exploiting opportunities can only be learned by doing. Empirical studies generally
support this positive relationship (Gimeno et al., 1997; Bosma et al., 2004; Santarelli
and Tran, 2012). Industry experience also enables entrepreneurs to enhance their
performance as well, but the effect is not significant.
Regarding initial financial capital, the fact that entrepreneurs have other income-
generating jobs and do not consider the firm as their main source of income sig-
nificantly erodes entrepreneurial motivation in boosting firm performance. We wit-
ness the positive leveraging effect of debt over the firm’s capital structure through
positive effect of the debt ratio: Firms may be more motivated and committed to
perform productively and efficiently when they stay under the pressure of incurring
costs of capital and paying back loans. We also witness the negative and increasing
effect of capital required on firm income. Large size of initial capital investment
required reflects high sunk cost of capital intensive industry, and thus placing
higher risk for entrepreneurs to break even and generate sustainable income.
Personal equity does not have statistically significant effects on entrepreneurial per-
formance, but it helps to relax capital constraints.
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Consistent with the results from the capital constraint equation, social capital
from weak ties (formal business association participation) does not enhance entre-
preneurial performance significantly. Network members do not obtain the benefits of
relaxing the constraints, as well as other intangible benefits to foster their income.
Consistent with recent findings by Santarelli and Tran (2013) and De Jong et al.
(2012), the reason for the scant significance of the coefficient of our social capital
variable may be found in the fact that business networks in Vietnam are mainly
politics-based, rather than economics-based. In the recent report on characteristics of
the Vietnamese business environment from the follow-up survey in 2011, the ma-
jority of firms report that the most important reasons for joining business association
are due to its provision of services concerning communication of new policies and
laws to firms and other private sector services such as trade fairs, which are hard to
be capitalized in real economic effects. Only 20 percent claim that network mem-
bership provides a preferential route for accessing credit from trading partners13
(Ciem, 2012). However, when we investigate the impacts of entrepreneurs’ personal
network structure, network size and network intensity—defined as the pattern of
relationships that are engendered from the direct and indirect ties among actors
(Hoang and Antoncic, 2003)—the coefficient of network size is statistically signifi-
cant despite being numerically small. Because network size is positively related to the
likelihood of being capital constrained of family firms (from the analysis of capital
constraint equation above) and capital constrained firms outperform non–capital
constrained ones (mentioned above), it is logical to interpret that those firms having
more useful contacts in their network will discover more business opportunities from
network information sharing, and thus are thirsty for more investment capital (being
capital constrained), and on trying by all means to mobilize sufficient capital from
different sources to exploit the opportunities, they produce positive growth and
development for their firms. The insignificant effect of network frequency, on the
other hand, indicates that the quality of network assistance is essentially more im-
portant than the quantity or frequency of network assistance. Regarding the effect of
strong ties on business income, the benefit is limited to emotional support from self-
employed family members only. All these findings reconfirm the equivalent study by
Santarelli and Tran (2013) on the effect of social capital on entrepreneurial perform-
ance of Vietnamese manufacturing private firms.
We also find interesting effects in relation to some of the other control variables in
Table 7. Both younger entrepreneurs and younger firms perform better. The signifi-
cant negative sign of the “age” parameters shows the negative relationship between
entrepreneurs’ age and their entrepreneurial profit gained. An entrepreneur with 10
13As shown by McMillan and Woodruff (1999), customers identified through business networks are
likely to receive large amounts of commercial credit from their trading partners. Nevertheless, this
does not necessarily imply that the recipients of this kind of external financing are firms character-
ized by superior economic performance (cf. Malesky and Taussig, 2009).
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years of seniority in the business is estimated to earn approximately 7.1% profit less.
This result confirms findings by Cucculelli and Micucci (2008), Parker and van Praag
(2006), and Miller (1991), who found a negative relationship between the two vari-
ables: that is, aging makes the contribution of the founder progressively less valuable
for company performance. Age may be a salient predictor of entrepreneurial behav-
iors in family firms because their CEO is often preoccupied with succession issues as
they age (Feltham et al., 2005). As succession grows nearer, the aging CEO may place
greater importance on a smooth transition with fear of losing family wealth than on
the need to pursue risky entrepreneurial ventures. In a dynamic business environ-
ment of a transitional economy as Vietnam’s, the rules of games are continuously
changing and the age–performance relationship is more responsive to aging. On the
other hand, longer tenure of the leaders exerts considerably positive influence on
firm performance. Tenure inspires entrepreneurial behavior because it allows the
entrepreneur to accumulate a wealth of knowledge and experience, making him or
her better able to select appropriate entrepreneurial behaviors, thereby increasing the
subsequent entrepreneurial performance (Levesque and Minniti, 2006). Long CEO
tenure may also allow the CEO to build valuable relationships among organizational
networks. However, longer tenure has been found to be more likely to stimulate
entrepreneurs to conform to industry norms and compromise the comfortable status
quo. Zahra (2005) found that CEO tenure was negatively related to innovativeness in
his study of more than 2000 family firms. Formally registered firms under the
Enterprise Law are likely to perform more profitably than unregistered counterparts.
Finally, younger firms and larger firms, in both labor size and economic size, get
higher profit. There is no difference in terms of profitability between male and female
entrepreneurs.
6. Discussion and suggestions for policy actions
The shift from centrally planned economy to market economy in Vietnam has led to
the emergence of a large number of private enterprises, especially family firms. For
these businesses to remain competitive in both local and international markets, it is
important to understand various constraints that impede their survival and prosper-
ity. This article is the first investigation that attempts to investigate the extent to
which the performance of a family business venture, once started, is affected by
capital constraints at the time of inception. We have taken into account the possi-
bility that human and social capital might also have an indirect effect on firm per-
formance by facilitating access to financial capital, thus diluting any capital
constraint. We recognized the likely endogeneity of capital constraint, and thus
used IV estimation. Our principal findings are fourfold.
First, other things held constant, entrepreneurs who suffer from capital constrains
earn on average 4.9% more profit than those who do not. Although not intuitively
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understandable as most of the literature on capital constraints finds a negative effect
of the constraint on entrepreneurial performance (see, e.g. Parker and van Praag,
2006), this finding is sizeable in economic terms, fully consistent with the resource
dependency theory approach, and corroborated by the results of other studies con-
ducted for Vietnam (e.g. Malesky and Taussig, 2009).
Second, the share of the entrepreneur’s own capital is positively related to entre-
preneurial performance, even though this relationship is not statistically strong.
Third, educational level significantly reduces the likelihood of entrepreneurs’
facing capital constraints. This finding is consistent with the comparable studies
(Bosma et al., 2004; Parker and van Praag, 2006), which claim that educational
level relaxes the pressure from capital constraints.
Fourth, when we look at the structure and quality of entrepreneurs’ personal
networks, and correct for the effect of endogeneity of capital constraints on entre-
preneurial performance, we find that entrepreneurs having more useful business
contacts exhibit superior performance. However, the frequency of assistance does
not have a significant effect on family firms’ performance. The real benefits of social
relationships for family firms seem to stem from the strength and quality of network
contacts, rather than shallow and formal participation. The nature of business net-
works in Vietnam is still mainly political and somewhat compulsory for established
incumbent firms in capital-intensive or mature industries. Nevertheless, as shown by
McMillan and Woodruff (1999) for Vietnam and other authors for Russia (Batjargal,
2007), Eastern Europe (Paldam and Svendsen, 2000), and China (Koch, 2005), evi-
dences of social capital benefits from business network participation are being
observed also in transitional economies. Therefore, future policy action should en-
courage the establishment of genuinely business-oriented networks (rather than pol-
itically based) to support directly entrepreneurs, especially small-sized ones, in both
their daily operations and long-term strategic management. This finding opens fur-
ther space for future research on the diversity, concentration dynamic interaction
between different types of social networks, and benefits obtained from them because
a weakness of our study is that we have not been able to isolate various characteristics
of networks (functions, diversity, strength of ties, density, degree of centrality, and so
forth) owing to the limitation of data.
In terms of policy implications, when human capital and financial capital are
interrelated and endogenous, many governments support the dual-track approach
that involves attempting to soften capital constraints while simultaneously develop-
ing initiatives to deepen human capital (Parker and van Praag, 2006). However, this
approach may be questionable for the case of Vietnam. This is due to the fact that
capital constraints in Vietnam are not the negative signal to show the poor perform-
ance of firms, but the positive sign of fast growth instead. Thus, except for prioritized
loans for disadvantaged entrepreneurs, credits for entrepreneurial investments, in
general, are signal of economic development, if they are considered to be feasible
and profitable.
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A potential weakness of this research lies in the fact that we only consider those
firms surviving from the year of establishment until 2006 to investigate their con-
tinuous performance for 4 years in a balanced panel data. Thus, we are unable to
track the capital constraints of bankrupting firms to explore whether it has influences
on family firms’ survival. In addition, the findings might be influenced by specific
features of the Vietnamese cultural and institutional environment and therefore not
be applicable to other transition economies.
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